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Donald K. Swearer Control and freedom: The structure of 
Buddhist meditation in the Pali suttas 
Of all forms of religious practice, none exemplifies Buddhism better than the 
practice of meditation. Anesaki and Takakusu claim that meditation is " ... the 
universal method of mental culture of all Indian religious schools,"1 and Ed-
ward Conze writes, "meditational practices constitute the very core of the 
Buddhist approach to life .... On the way to Nirvava they serve to promote 
spiritual development, to diminish the impact of suffering, to calm the mind 
and to reveal the true facts of existence."2 
This article is an attempt to analyze the structure of Buddhist meditation 
within the Pali suttas. Our contention is that this structure is built around two 
foci-control and freedom. The ultimate aim of Buddhist meditation is free-
dom from the bondage of attachment to sense objects. This liberating state of 
being is reached through a process of consciousness control ( samiidhi) and 
insight into the real nature of the world ( vipassanii). While Theravada Bud-
dhism tends to distinguish samiidhi and vipassanii as two separate types of 
meditation, both aim to achieve enlightenment ( sambodha). Furthermore, as 
this article will show, they may be seen as basically complementary rather than 
as mutually exclusive methods. 
The structure of Buddhist meditation, which emerges from a study of the 
Pali suttas, may be depicted by an hourglass figure3 : 
The path to enlightenment begins with a general awareness and proceeds to 
a greater and greater degree of consciousness refinement. This process pro-
duces decreasing degrees of attachment to the world of sense objects. The 
jhiinas represent a transition from a narrowing of consciousness to its eventual 
expansion resulting in a condition of "hedonic neutrality," that is, upekkhii. 
In this state the consciousness is totally freed ( cetovimutti) from those con-
ditions which qualify ordinary states of mind. It is characterized as immeasur-
able, nothingness, emptiness, and signless. In this mind-freed state, the 
knowledge of enlightenment (paiiiiavimutti) is fully realized. Or, in a better 
known idiom, one has attained nibbiina. 
SATI AND MINDFUL AWARENESS 
The process of meditation and the control of consciousness begin with sati 
and sampajaiiiia, two practically inseparable terms in the Pali canon.4 They 
are widely discussed in the Pifakas and later commentaries, and according to 
Dot1ald K. Swearer is Associate Professor of Religion at Swarthmore College. 
1 Masaharu Anesaki and Junjiro Takakusu, "Dhyana," Encyclopedia of Religion and 
Ethics, ed. James A. Hastings, vol. 4 (New York: Scribner, 1912), p. 702. 
2 Edward Conze, Buddhist Meditation (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956), p. 11. 
3 For a different model see Conze, Buddhist Meditation, p. 16. 
4 The meaning of sati and sampajaiiiia came to be nearly synonymous. Sampajaiiiia is 
formed from the verb, pa-janati + sam meaning to come to know altogether, hence, to 
discriminate and comprehend. 
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a contemporary Buddhist one of the suttas devoted entirely to an exposition 
of sati and sampajanna is among the most highly respected and frequently 
memorized Buddhist texts in Ceylon.5 The Pali word sati is related to San-
skrit smrti, meaning "remembered" or "recollected." In Hinduism the word 
has come to stand for a body of "remembered" literature (for example, the 
Epics, sutras, Pural)aS) in contrast to "revealed" or sruti texts (for example, 
Samitas, BrahmatJas, Upani~ads). The term in Pali has taken on, not only 
the connotation of something called to mind or remembered, but also mind-
fulness, intentness of mind, or wakefulness.6 Nyal)aponika interprets sati as 
"bare attention" and sampajanna as "clear comprehension."7 Sati as bare at-
tention has a threefold value of helping the mind to know, shape, and liberate 
itsel£.8 Its knowing function is to analyze the objects of existence through dis-
section and discrimination and realize the conditioned and conditioning nature 
of all phenomenal entities. Sati shapes individual's lives by causing reflective 
action rather than immediate responses. Thus the mind gains a new power 
and a new freedom from control by habitual action-response. As Nyal)aponika 
expresses it, "Right Mindfulness recovers for man the lost pearl of his freedom 
snatching it from the jaws of the dragon Time."9 The third value of sati is 
the freeing of the mind. Paradoxically the control of attention and reflection 
liberates the mind rather than confining it, for it is sati that produces the in-
sight (vipassana) into the true nature of things. This realization leads to 
detachment from ordinary preoccupation with the objects and goals of the 
mundane world. 
If sati, or bare attention, is a discipline of the consciousness appropriate to 
the act of meditation itself, sampajanna can be understood as the integration 
of sati with right knowledge ( ntitJa) or wisdom (panna) . S ampajaiiiia is ap-
plied to intentionality and action in particular, and more generally to the 
awareness that at no time is there an abiding personality or ego behind one's 
intentions and actions. The sampajanna dimension of mindfulness emphasizes 
the fact that the fundamental nonbeingness ( anatta) of life is not limited to 
a serene moment of detached and quiet meditation, but conditions every act 
and thought of the individual. 
Within the Nikayas there are three suttas devoted entirely to a discussion 
of sati and sampajaiiiia: the Mahlisatipa!fhana Suttanta of the Digha Nikaya, 
5 The Foundations of Mindfulness (Satipafthana Sutta), trans. Nya!}asatta Thera (Kandy, 
Ceylon: The Buddhist Publication Society, 1960). 
6 Rhys Davids, T. W. and Stede, The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary (Lon-
don: Luzac & Co., 1959), p. 672 (hereafter cited as Rhys Davids and Stede, Pali-English 
Dictionary). 
7 Nya!}aponika Thera, The Hearl of Buddhist Meditation (London: Rider & Co., 1962), 
p. 30 (hereafter cited as Nyal}aponika, The Heart). 
8 Ibid., p. 34. 
9 Ibid., p. 41. 
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the Satipaf!hlina Sutta of the Majjhima Nikiiya and the forty-seventh chapter 
of the S mnyutta N ikiiya (Kindred Sayings on the Arisings of Mindfulness). 
The first Sutta in particular will serve as our guide for a more detailed ex-
position of sati. 
The Mahlisatipatthlina Suttanta is nearly identical with the Satipa[tana 
Sutta of the Majjhima Nikiiya with the exception of an exposition of the 
Four Noble Truths at its conclusion. We are told at the beginning of this 
dialogue that the only path leading to the purification of beings, of passing 
beyond grief and lamentation, of the dying out of suffering and misery and 
the realization of nibbiina is the fourfold setting up of mindfulness.H1 In order 
to come to grips with the full dimension of sati these four stages of mindful-
ness must be analyzed. 
In the first place, mindfulness demands a control of the body (kiiya) 
which overcomes the desire and misery typical of the world.U This end is 
accomplished by practices of meditation and concentration. The bhikkhu is 
to isolate himself, assume a posture of meditation, and practice breathing 
exercises with a total consciousness of every act so that the bodily organism 
will be tranquilized.12 
Mindfulness of the body begins with awareness of respiration. The Bud-
dhist preoccupation with respiration exercises represents a continuity with 
earlier Indian thought. In the late f!.g Veda and the Briihmal)as, breath was 
one of the objects of cosmogonic speculation, the life force through which it 
was thought the world might have come into being.13 Breathing exercises 
(prii1Jiiyiima) also played an important role in Hindu hatha yoga. There the 
practice was eventually to arrest the movement of inhalation and exhalation. 
The purpose of breath control in yoga, however, was not merely to gain 
power over respiratory functions but access to higher states of consciousness. 
Thus Bhoja's commentary on the Yoga Sutras of Patafijali reads: "All the 
functions of the organs being preceded by that of respiration-there being 
always a connection between respiration and consciousness in their respective 
functions-respiration, when all the functions of the organs are suspended, 
realizes concentration of consciousness on a single object."14 
Breathing exercises as the initiation of sati seem to have a dual function 
not unlike that in the practice of ha[ha yoga, namely, to engender control 
over the body but also to produce an awareness of the real nature of the 
10 The Digha Nikaya, 3 vols., eds., T. W. Rhys Davids and J. Estlin Carpenter (London: 
Luzac & Co., 1890-1911) 2:290. 
11 Ibid., p. 291. 
12 Ibid. 
13 For example, see f!.g Veda 10: 129. 
14 Quoted in Mircea Eliade, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, trans. Willard R. Trask 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1958), p. 55. 
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body. As NyaQaponika Thera observes, the mindfulness of breathing is both 
a subject for "tranquility-meditation" ( samathabhavana) as well as an act 
used for the development of insight ( vipassanabhtivana) .11> 
Following the initiation of mindfulness through breathing exercises, the 
Mahtisatipa!fhiina Suttanta moves to contemplation of various aspects of 
the body and its functions. They are in brief: ( 1) mindfulness of bodily 
postures (2) contemplation of the parts of the body ( 3) reflection on the 
constituent elements of the body, and ( 4) the so-called cemetery contempla-
tions. Turning first to the mindfulness of bodily postures the bhikkhu is 
enjoined to contemplate (anupassanli) the body internally and externally as 
something that comes into being and passes away again.16 Furthermore, 
such contemplation should accompany every act so that " ... when [the bhik-
khu] is walking, [he] is aware of it thus: -'I walk' ; or when he is standing, 
or sitting, or lying down, he is aware of it."17 The purpose of the mindfulness 
of the bodily postures is to gain the knowledge ( fiti1Ja) that he dwells inde-
pendent, grasping after nothing in the world.18 Awareness of bodily postures, 
therefore, should produce such a total self-awareness in the adept that "In 
going, standing, sitting, sleeping, watching, talking or keeping silence he 
knows ( sampajlina) what he is doing."19 This total self-knowledge is directed 
toward two ends: (1) an acknowledgment of the impermanence of the body 
(its arising and decay) and (2) an independence (anissito) from any attach-
ment to the phenomenal world. 
The contemplation of the parts of the body is an extension of mindfulness 
regarding the body and its functions. It begins with an enumeration of vari-
ous physical organs and bodily products ranging from hair to the heart to 
urine. This description of the body and its parts is likened to a bag filled with 
various kinds of grain which can be separated out and identified: " ... And 
a keen-eyed man ... reflects as he pour(s) them out:-'that's rice, that's 
paddy, those are beans,' and so forth. Even so, bhikkhus, does a brother 
reflect on the body from the soles of the feet below upward to the crown 
of the head, as something enclosed in skin and full of divers impurities."20 
Reflection on the parts of the body becomes even more discriminating or 
analytical, however. From physical parts, the bhikkhu moves his attention 
to the fundamental bases ( dhtitu) or constituent elements of which the body 
is composed. In the Theravada scheme of things these basic elements are 
Hi NyaJ:)aponika, The Heart, p. 63. 
16 The Digha Nikilya, 2:292. 
17 The Dialogues of the Buddha (Digha Nikaya), 3 vols., trans. T. W. Rhys Davids and 
C. A. F. Rhys Davids (London: Luzac & Co., 1899-1959), 4th ed., 2:329 (hereafter cited 
as Dialogues). 
1s The Digha Nikaya, 2:292. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Dialogues, 2:330. 
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four-earth, water, heat, and air. Mindfulness of the fact that the body is 
composed of these elements is likened to the butcher who, when he has slain 
an ox, displays the carcass piece by piece.21 There appears to be a twofold 
purpose behind the development of mindfulness regarding the various parts 
and constituent elements of the body: ( 1) the knowledge that no abiding ego 
exists in the body but only those parts that can be observed and inferred from 
this observation and (2) the essentially "vile" and impermanent nature of 
the body. 
This second purpose is carried to even greater extremes in the fourth 
aspect of bodily mindfulness, the cemetery contemplations. Here the bhikkhu 
is enjoined to contemplate his own body as though it were undergoing ever 
increasing degrees of decomposition after death. Initially he contemplates a 
body abandoned in a graveyard which is swollen and turning black and blue; 
then a body which has been partially eaten by wild animals; and finally a 
body which has been reduced to a mere heap of bones.22 All of these con-
templations are symbols of the transient nature of the body.23 
The second stage of mindfulness is to arrive at the same degree of aware-
ness of the true nature of the feelings ( vedanii) as was developed by the 
body. The bhikkhu must be able to distinguish among feelings that are plea-
surable ( sukha), painful ( dukkha), or neutral as well as feelings concerning 
either spiritual ( siimisa) or material ( niramisa) things. 24 All of these types 
of vedanii are subject to arising and dying away, just as is the body; hence, 
they are transient, ephemeral. Mindfulness of feelings, consequently, just as 
mindfulness regarding the body, produces a detachment, an independence 
from the things of this world. 
After subjecting the body ( kaya) and the feelings ( vedanii) to the kind 
of objective scrutiny that leads to an understanding of their true nature, the 
bhikkhu developing mindfulness turns his attention to citta, " ... the ever-
changing, ever-active continuance of consciousness, or reacting intelligence"25 
21 Ibid., p. 331. 
22 The Digha Nikaya, 2:294-297. 
23 The preoccupation of early Buddhism with the notion of death offers some interesting 
possibilities of interpretation other than the rather obvious one given in the text. It 
might, for instance, be an outgrowth of archaic shamanistic practices, for the shaman is 
one who above all else is qualified by a knowledge of death. On this point see Mircea 
Eliade, Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy, trans. Willard R. Trask (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1964), p. 509£ (hereinafter cited as Eliade, Shamanism). On 
the other hand, in the dialectic between the sacred and the profane, death plays a very 
important role. For example, as Van Gennep and others point out, rites of initiation 
marking a passage from a "profane" state to a "sacred" state are not infrequently sig-
naled by a symbolic recreation of death on the part of the initiate. Arnold Van Gennep, 
The Rites of Passage (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 75f. 
24 The Digha Nikaya, 2:298. 
25 Dialogues, 2:325. 
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and also to dhamma, the ideas, cognizable objects or presentations beyond the 
stage of mere sensory reaction.26 Regarding the citta or conscious thinking 
process the monk must become aware of its various modes, for example, 
lustful, dull, intelligent, attentive, or distrait. That this awareness or knowl-
edge of the states of the mind is for the purpose of control is illustrated by 
the following passage from the Vitakkasanthana Sutta of the Majjhima 
Nikaya: 
... if while the monk is attending to the thought function and form of those 
thoughts, there still arise evil unskilled thoughts associated with desire and 
associated with aversion and associated with confusion, . . . that monk, his 
teeth clenched, his tongue pressed against his palate, should by his mind sub-
due, restrain and dominate his mind ( citta) . 27 
Through awareness directed toward the mind, the monk is enabled both to 
understand and subdue or control the mind or consciousness (citta). It is 
recognized that citta as well as kaya and vedana comes into being but then 
passes away.28 
Regarding the dhamma or ideas, the Mahasatipa!fhana Suttanta specifically 
mentions five groups: (1) the five hindrances (nivaratta), (2) the five groups 
( khandha), ( 3) the five spheres of sense ( ayatana), ( 4) the seven factors of 
enlightenment and, ( 5) the four Aryan truths. All of these groups of dhamma 
are to be reflected upon with the same scrutiny as body, feelings, and mind 
with the intent purpose of leading the monk to an independence where he 
grasps after nothing in the world. 
Directing his attention toward the five aggregates ( khandha), the bhikkhu 
considers individually their arising and passing away until in a state of non-
grasping he attains to mindfulness. Contemplating the six ayatanas or the 
internal and external spheres of sense, the monk is made aware that any 
fetters that bind him to the world are a result of the coming together of the 
organs of sense and the objects of sense. By his analysis he becomes of the 
arising and the putting aside of all fetters. Of the seven factors of enlighten-
ment the bhikkhu must grow aware " ... if they are subjectively present, or 
absent, and he is aware of how there comes an uprising of any factor not 
hitherto uprisen, and of how there comes a full development of such factors 
when it has arisen."29 Finally the Mahasatipa!fhana Suttanta expounds the 
four Aryan truths, which must also be considered in terms of the same pat-
tern of their arising and passing away. 
What in belief is the purpose of sati-sampajaiiiia? In general terms mind-
26 Ibid. 
27 The Middle Length Sayings (M ajjhima-Nikaya), 3 vols., trans. I. B. Horner (Lon-
don: Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1954-1959), 1:155. 
2s The Digha Nikaya, 2:299. 
29 Dialogues, 2:336. 
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fulness produces a profound self-awareness. More specifically it is intended 
to produce a detachment from the world of sense through controlling the 
sensory inputs, and realizing the fundamental impermanence or nonbeingness 
( anattii) of existence. Mindfulness, therefore, offers both a theoretical and 
practical means for the ". . . realization of that liberating truth of no-self 
( anattii), having the two aspects of egolessness and voidness of substance."30 
This realization is a "lived understanding." That is, it is arrived at through 
a carefully graded program in which control of the senses is coupled with an 
objective, discriminating knowing. The method of mindfulness conjoins psy-
chomental programming, epistemological shifts, and ontological transforma-
tion. It lays the groundwork for later developments, in the meditative life. 
SAMADHI AND ONEPOINTEDNESS 
Samadhi represents a greater degree of control over the mind or conscious-
ness ( citta, viniiiit:a) than sati. As the word itself ( sam-a-dha) denotes, 
samadhi is a bringing together, a concentration of the mind in contrast to 
the more general practice of mindfulness ( sati). In early Buddhism the im-
portant relationship between samiidhi as the process whereby one concentrates 
his thoughts and controls his consciousness and s'ila or the ethical and moral 
behavior of the religious man is a general assumption. For our purposes, 
however, samadhi has crucial implications for the higher goals of the salva-
tion-quest. 
In the Subha Sutta of the Digha Nikaya the young Brahman, Subha, asks 
Ananda to expound the doctrine regarding samadhi. The resulting answer 
includes elements which overlap with other categories of this exposition, but 
several points are made which will serve as a basis for our discussion of 
samiidhi. 
In the first place the sutta affirms that one practices samiidhi by guarding 
the doors of the senses.31 This particular practice is described as follows: 
when the monk sees an object with his eye he is not grasped either by its 
general appearance or by its details ; he restrains whatever factor might cause 
the arising of evil elemental reactions ; so restraining his sense of sight he 
attains mastery over his sense of sight.32 In a similar fashion he controls his 
other sense organs: " ... when he hears a sound with his ear, or smells an 
odor with his nose or tastes a flavor with his tongue or feels a touch with 
his body, or cognizes ( viiinaya) a phenomenon ( dhamma) with his mind 
he is not grasped either by the general appearance or the details of it."33 By 
so Nyal}aponika, The Heart, p. 75. 
31 The Digha Niktiya, 1:207, alsop. 70. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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so restraining all of his senses, including the manas or conscious mind, he 
experiences an unblemished happiness. Having so restrained and guarded all 
the sense organs so that no element ( dhamma) of the mundane world may 
claim him, the bhikkhu is now mindful (sati) and with clear comprehension 
( sampajaiiiia). As described in the Subha Sutta, therefore, samlidhi begins 
when the senses are no longer subject to the rule of the objects of sense. 
In the Cu!avedalla Sutta of the Majjhima Nikiiya the layman Visakha asks 
the nun Dhammadinna, "What is concentration ( samadhi), what are the 
distinguishing marks of concentration, what is the development of concentra-
tion ?"34 To this question the wise nun replies that samlidhi is onepointedness 
of mind ( cittassa ekaggatii), its marks the four objects of mindfulness, its 
requisites the four right efforts and that whatever leads to the increase of 
these is, in effect, the development of concentration.311 This passage points to 
the close relationship between sati and samiidhi. That is, concentration ap-
pears to presuppose the four objects of mindfulness. Samlidhi, however, goes 
beyond the awareness of impermanence and sensory detachment produced by 
sati. It is a refined control of the consciousness, a concentration of the mind 
to a single point, thereby eliminating all extraneous thoughts. Buddhaghosa 
in applying the definition cittassa ekaggata to samlidhi elaborates as follows: 
" [ samadhi] is the centering of the consciousness and consciousness-concomi-
tants evenly and rightly on a single object."36 The man of concentrated 
( samadhi) and one-pointed ( ekaggata) mind, therefore, stands in stark con-
trast to the profane man who is "empty-headed, frivolous and loose in talk."37 
The Cu!avedalla Sutta's exposition of samadhi also says that the requisites 
of concentration are the four right efforts. The four right efforts are described 
in various parts of the Nikayas as follows: checking the rise of evil and wrong 
states of consciousness not yet arisen ; shedding evil and wrong states that 
have already arisen ; encouraging the rise of right states not yet arisen; 
ensuring that right states which are already there shall be multiplied and 
developed.38 The four right efforts are frequently mentioned as one of the 
formula truths reported to have been perceived by the Buddha and passed 
on to his disciples.39 While this formula does indeed point to a relationship 
between samadhi and the production and retention of right constituent states 
of conscious being, it raises the broader issue of the place of samiidhi in a 
34 The Middle Length Sayings, 1:363. 
35 The Majjhirna Nikiiya, 3 vols., ed. V. Trenckner, R. Chalmers, and C. A. F. Rhys 
Davids (London: Luzac & Co., 1888-1899), 1:295. 
36 Buddhaghosa, The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga), trans. Bhikkhu Nal)amoli 
(Colombo, Ceylon: R. Semage, 1956), p. 85. 
87 The Book of Gradual Sayings (Ang ttara-Nikaya), 5 vols., trans. F. L. Woodward 
and E. H. Hare (London: Oxford University Press, 1932-1936), 5:65. 
38 The Majjhima Nikaya, 2:11. 
39 For example, see The Digha Nikllya, 2:120. 
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variety of conceptual structures illustrative of an enlightened state of mind. 
For instance all of the five iddhipiidas, the paths to the attainment of supra-
normal powers, are dependent on samiidhi. 40 The five forces ( indriyani) or 
organs of spiritual sense include samiidhi which is described by one Buddhist 
scholar as "the dominant faculty, which brings about concentration of thoughts 
and makes the adept rise higher and higher in meditations."41 Samiidhi is 
also the sixth of the seven factors leading to enlightenment, 42 and it has 
already been pointed out that concentration is one of the three major di-
visions of the Noble Eightfold Path. On the basis of the crucial role played 
by samiidhi in the formulae cited, it is arguable that concentration of mind is 
the necessary step to the attainment of a higher truth and the powers ac-
companying it. 
The Buddhist adept who chooses the way of samiidhi begins his religious 
quest with a general awareness of the nature of the self and reality but must 
move beyond the state of objective detachment produced by this mindfulness. 
He must progress to a unity of concentration which eliminates the flow of 
sensory material into his conscious mind. By such a concentrated effort he 
is able to rise to higher forms of apperception, to a mystic intuition of a re-
ality veiled to ordinary perception.43 
JHANA, STAGES TO THE ULTIMATE 
Buddhist meditation progresses from samiidhi to jhiina, or from concentration 
and onepointedness to the gradual expansion of the consciousness to hitherto-
fore unexperienced dimensions. In the Pali Suttas, jhiina is often found as 
part of the formula of the four jhlinas, where it is translated as mental ab-
sorption or trance. By carefully analyzing this formula and the contexts in 
which it occurs, the significance of jhana in relationship to the control of 
consciousness and saving-knowledge will become clear. 
In the Brahmajiila Sutta a discussion of the four jhiinas occurs within the 
context of the question, "How may the self or soul ( atta) attain to the high-
est Nibbana in this visible world?" It is in answer to this question that an 
explication of the four jhanas is set forth. 
4() The five iddhipiJdas are resolution ( chanda), effort ( viriya), consciousness ( citta), 
and investigation (vima1f!Sc'i). The Digha Nikaya, 3:77. 
41 Nalinaksha Dutt, Early Monastic Buddhism, rev. ed. (Calcutta: Oriental Book Agency, 
1960), p. 248. 
42 The seven factors or limbs of enlightenment (sambojjhanga) are: sati, dhammavicaya, 
viriya, piti, passaddhi, samadhi, and upekkhli. 
43 The process of mental training became greatly elaborated in the scholastic or Abhi-
dhamma period of Theravada Buddhism. Nalinaksha Dutt provides an excellent discussion 
of the various fonns of samlidhi (as represented in particular by the Vissuddhimagga) in 
chapter 7 of Early Monastic Buddhism. 
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In this sutta it is accepted as an a priori condition of phenomenal existence 
that the self is subject to kama or sensuous desires. It is also the case that 
sensuous desires are characterized by impermanence ( anicca). Phenomenal 
existence, therefore, necessarily involves suffering since sensory pleasures are 
constantly subject to change. The only way one can hope to achieve happiness 
and joy (pUisukha) is by cutting off kama. In the first jhana this state is 
accomplished by detachment ( viveka) accompanied by reflection and inves-
tigation ( vitakka-vicara). In order to understand this jhana these three terms 
must be studied in some detail. 
The term viveka has a threefold significance: a physical separation from 
the world in the sense of "seclusion"; an intellectual separation in the sense 
of "discrimination" ; and an ethical separation in the sense of the mind ( citta) 
"being separate from the world."44 For instance, in the Mahasuiiiiata Sutta 
the Buddha tells Ananda that a bhikkhu who delights in society cannot enjoy 
well-being or emancipation of mind ( cetovimutti) but that such happiness 
demands renunciation, solitude, and enlightenment ( sambodha) .45 The Bud-
dha claims that as a Tathagata he has reached such a state of isolation 
( viveka) by dismissing thoughts of all attendant phenomena and by develop-
ing and dwelling in a state of emptiness ( suiiiiata) .46 The sutta goes on to 
say that a monk who likewise desires to develop and dwell in inward empti-
ness should calm, tranquilize, focus and concentrate his mind inwardly.47 
This sutta clearly indicates that viveka implies both a physical separation 
from the delights of ordinary worldly intercourse as well as an isolation of 
the mind ( citta). It is interesting to note that the resultant separation is 
described as a condition of inward emptiness ( suiiiiata) since in the later 
Madhyamika tradition the perspective on this important term will shift from 
a psychophysical emphasis to an ontological one. 
In the Na!akapana Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya, viveka is described in 
terms of separation from sensuous desires and from the evil constituents of 
being. This separation is said to result in the attainment of joy and happiness. 
The Tathagata who has reached such a state has overcome the attachments 
to the mundane world known as the asavas, which produce the suffering of 
"birth, old age and death."48 Viveka, then, means a detachment from the 
world of sense with its accompanying desires and kammic resultants of 
rebirth. 
The terms vitakka and vicara should be taken together. In fact T. W. Rhys 
Davids contends that by examining the use of these two words in earlier 
44 The Dialogues of the Buddha, 1:84 (see the footnote). 
45 The Majjhima Nikiiya, 3:110. 
46 Ibid., 3: 111. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 1 : 464. 
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and later works, one concludes that they once had synonymous meanings.49 
They came to have slightly different intentions, however, with vitakka refer-
ring in particular to initial thought or observation and vicara denoting con-
tinuing or sustained investigation and reflection. Together they are used to 
indicate" ... the whole of the mental process of thinking."50 
In the Upakkilesa Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya both vitakka and vicara 
are related to concentration ( samadhi). The Buddha is recorded as saying 
that by developing samadhi in several modes beginning with vitakka and 
vicara, he gained the knowledge ( iiiitJa) and the vision ( dassana) that his 
final liberation ( vimutti) was assured. V itakka and vicara, therefore are im-
portant to the concentration (samadhi) of one's thoughts and act as one of 
the first steps toward the attainment of the apperception ( dassana) of ulti-
mate reality. They share with viveka the characteristics of directing the in-
dividual away from mere sensory reality. Thus in the Dasuttara Suttanta of 
the Digha N ikaya the eight thoughts ( vitakka) of the great man ( mahapu-
risa) include the limitation of desires, detachment, and mental concentration.111 
As we shall see, however, vitakka can become dangerous. As the Sakkapaiiha 
Suttanta of the Digha Nikaya points out, vitakka can become a mental pre-
occupation which causes desire ( chanda), 52 the root of attachment to the 
mundane world. 53 
In sum, the first jhiina is depicted primarily as a condition of detachment. 
It involves a physical, intellectual, and ethical separation from the phenomenal 
world. An important phase of the development of the concentration necessary 
to acquire the first jhiina is careful thought and analysis of one's self and the 
surrounding world. 
The second jhiina is achieved when observation and investigation ( vitakka 
and vicara) are suppressed. In this stage these two mental functions are said 
to be ofarika or gross, implying that they are necessarily involved in the 
empirical world. The second jhiina is characterized by joy and happiness 
(pitisukha), born not of viveka or detachment but of samadhi, translated by 
Rhys Davids in this passage as "serenity."54 This state is further character-
ized by a tranquil inner nature and a concentrated mind or heart.55 
Just as the first jhiina was labeled gross ( o!arika) since it involved vitakka 
and vicara, the second acquires the same rubric because it is characterized by 
49 Rhys-Davids and Stede, Pali-English Dictionary, p. 620. 
50 Ibid. 
51 The Dialogues of the Buddha, 3:261. 
52 In this particular case, chanda or excitement is nearly identical in meaning with tat~hi!., 
thirst or craving. 
53 The Digha Nikaya, 2:277. Dialogues, 2:311. 
54 Dialogues, 1:50. 
55 The Digha Nikaya, 1:37. 
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joy (piti) and an exhilaration of the heart.116 The qualities which are found 
in one who attains to the third jhana are equanimity ( upekkha) and mindful-
ness ( sati), "self-possession" ( sampajiina), dispassion ( viriiga), and an abid-
ing happiness. Finally in the fourth jhana the attention of the heart on 
happiness is transcended as is a concern with its opposite, dukkha or suffer-
ing.57 Similarly the polarity of somanassa and domanassa or mental distress 
is overcome. The last jhiina is, therefore, composed of pure equanimity and 
mindfulness ( upekkhiisatiparisuddhi) 58 and is "a state where some maintain 
the complete happiness, in the visible world, of a living being."59 
The fourfold jhiina formula appears again in the Siimaiiiiaphala Sutta, the 
discourse on the fruits of the life of a samatJa or recluse. In this sutta the dis-
cussion of the jhiinas is preceded by an overcoming of the five hindrances or 
nivara1;1as and is followed by the acquisition of supranormal powers or iddhi 
and abhinnii ( supranormal knowledge) as well as the overcoming of the 
lisavas. To understand more fully the role of jhiina within the scope of Bud-
dhist soteriology, we shall examine in some detail the most important of the 
concepts in this sutta, namely, nivara1Ja, iddhi, abhinnii, and iisava. 
The classical formula of the five nivara1;1as60 as found in the S amannaphala 
Sutta and elsewhere in the Nikayas (for example, Digha III, 49) is described 
as follows: ( 1) coveting the world, ( 2) malevolence and the desire to injure, 
( 3) stolidity and slothfulness, ( 4) excitement and misdeeds and ( 5) waver-
ing or doubt.61 One must overcome these hindrances so that in each case the 
mind may be purified. Separated from sensuous desires and evil elemental 
impulses the sama1Ja is enabled to enter into the sequence of the four jhanas 
previously described.62 With the exception of the fifth nivara1Ja the concern 
of this formula is clearly with those emotions which tend toward unreflective 
involvement in the phenomenal world. As Smhyutta Nikiiya 5:83 puts it, the 
nivara1;1as are conducive ". . . to the still more becoming and growth 
thereof."63 Involvement in the becoming of the phenomenal world supposes 
lack of insight or ignorance described as blindness and loss of sight. One 
who has not overcome the nivara1;1as obviously is unable to acquire any de-
gree of knowledge beyond that granted through the agency of the senses in 
dependence on the empirical world. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 1:37-38. 
58 Ibid., 1:38. 
59 Dialogues, 1:51. 
60 Nivarat_~a is the Sanskrit nis + varat_~a literally meaning not choosing or unable to 
choose and, hence, an obstacle or hindrance. 
61 The Dlgha Nikaya, 1:71. 
62 Ibid., 1:73. 
63 The Book of Kindred Sayings (Samyutta-Nikaya), 5 vols., trans. C. A. F. Rhys Davids 
and F. L. Woodward (London: Oxford University Press, 1917-1930), 5:70. 
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The Samannaphala Sutta makes clear, however, that one who passes 
through the jhanas transcends an ordinary involvement in the phenomenal 
world exemplified by the nivaranas. Through attaining the four jhtinas the 
consciousness or mind ( citta) is made pure ( parisuddha), freed from blem-
ish, devoid of evil ( kilesa), 64 stable and immovable. 65 The citta is thereby 
freed to direct itself toward the "insight that comes from knowledge."66 This 
insight is simply that this body ( kaya) has a form ( rupa) composed of the 
four great elements; that it is a result of a human birth; that it is perpetuated 
by partaking of foods; that it is impermanent and subject to dissolution and 
disintegration ; and that consciousness itself ( vifiiia1Ja) depends on the body 
and is bound up with it.67 With the citta purified and collected, the sama1Ja 
has the mental power to be able to create (maya) with it another body ( afiiia 
kaya) than the body subject to the frailties described above. As the text 
describes this process it is " ... as if a man were to pull out a reed from its 
sheath. He would know: 'this is the reed, this the sheath. The reed is one 
thing, the sheath another. It is from the sheath that the reed has been drawn 
forth.' And similarly were he to take a snake out of its slough, or draw a 
sword from its scabbard.''68 
The notion of manomaya or mental power has significant possibilities for 
this study; however, on the basis of the Pali texts it is difficult to arrive at 
a specific interpretation. In general the term denotes being made or formed 
by the mind, particularly as though magically made.69 For example, the Brah-
majala Sutta refers to the evolution of the world system to the point where 
most beings have been reborn in the "World of Radiance" and "there they 
dwell made of mind (manomaya), feeding on joy, radiating light from them-
selves, traversing the air [and] continuing in glory .... "70 A similar asso-
ciation of manomaya with a heavenly realm is found in the Apatttzaka Sutta 
of the Majjhima Nikaya. There it is stated that the corporeal gods are a 
product of manomaya.71 The two passages cited above clearly refer to the 
64 The word, kilesa, along with other terms such as the nivarat~a, tat~hti, the tisava, etc., 
has reference to unthinking involvement in the phenomenal or profane world. Kilesa 
literally means stain, soil, impurity and comes to stand for sensuous desires, passions, 
etc. "Its occurrence in the Pitakas is rare; in later works, very frequent, where it is 
approx. tantamount to our terms lower or unregenerate nature .... " Rhys Davids and 
Stede, Pali-English Dictionary, p. 216. 
65 The D'igha Nikaya, 1:76. 
66 Dialogues, 1:86. 
67 The D'igha Niktiya, 1:76. We find here a standard description of the body. Conscious-
ness (vinntit~a) in this instance indicates the five senses or the entire emotional and in-
tellectual process. See Dialogues, 1:87, notes 1 and 2. 
68 Dialogues, 1:88. 
69 Rhys Davids and Stede, Pali-English Dictionary, p. 521. 
70 Dialogues, 1:30. The D'igha Nikaya, 1:17. 
71 The Majjhima Nikaya, 1:410. 
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magical power of the mind by relating manomaya to the mythological realms 
of Buddhism. Indeed, manomaya' s earliest meaning may have been magically 
oriented-the notion that mano was responsible for the attainment of heavenly 
rewards of some form or another; however, we find that manomaya comes to 
assume both ethical and ontic connotations. 
For instance, the Dhammapiida opens with the following two verses: 
Mind is the forerunner of (all evil) states. Mind is chief; mind-made are they. 
If one speaks or acts with wicked mind, because of that, suffering follows one, 
even as the wheel follows the hoof of the draught-ox. 
Mind is the forerunner of (all good) states. Mind is chief; mind-made are 
they. If one speaks or acts with pure mind, because of that, happiness follows 
one, even as one's shadow that never leaves. 
In this passage the ethical and the ontic are definitely related in terms of 
mind, that is, the mind appears as the center point. It has, as it were, the power 
to create the "self." The ethical dimension stems from this fact. If the mind 
is ignorant and impure, one will suffer; if, on the other hand, the mind is 
enlightened and pure, one will attain happiness. 
Having overcome the five hindrances, attained the four mental absorptions 
and the power of manomaya, the samatJa now acquires iddhi or supranormal 
power, and abhiiina or supranormal knowledge. The term iddhi is of pre-
Buddhistic origin. In different contexts it may be used in the Pali texts to 
describe the potency of a king, a rich noble, a hunter, etc.72 In the Siimaii-
iiaphala Sutta, eight modes of iddhi are mentioned: ( 1) the power of becoming 
one or many, (2) the ability to become invisible, (3) passing through objects 
such as walls and hills, ( 4) penetrating through solid ground, ( 5) the power 
to walk on water, (6) traveling cross-legged in the sky, (7) touching the 
moon and the sun, (8) reaching Brahma heaven.73 
The above listed iddhis acquired by the Buddhist adept have striking simi-
larities with the archaic phenomenon of shamanism.74 The coincidence of char-
acteristics between these two religious practitioners has been studied by Mircea 
Eliade in his monograph, Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstacy.75 In 
particular he points to the "identity in expression" between the superhuman 
experiences of the Buddhist yogin and the archaic symbolism of ascent and 
flight found so frequently in shamanism.76 Symbols of ascent and flight are 
especially important since they illustrate the ecstatic experience at which 
72 Rhys Davids and Stede, Pali-English Dictionary, p. 120. 
'1ll Dialogues, 1:88-89. 
74 Eliade notes that the word, shaman, is derived through the Russian from the Tungusic, 
"saman." Some scholars, however, have derived the term from Pali. See Eliade, Shaman-
ism, p. 495. 
75 See chapter 11, "Shamanic Ideologies and Techniques Among the Indo-Europeans," 
in Eliade, Shamanism. 
76P.409. 
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shamanism aims. The shaman through the medium of this experience obtains 
a superhuman state of being enhancing him with such powers as flight, espe-
cially for the purpose of reaching otherworldly realms. The magical aspect of 
this power is well illustrated by our particular text, which specifically indicates 
that prior to the acquisition of iddhi, the samatJa has exercised the power of 
manomaya, the "magic" of his mind, in order to create "another body." It 
would appear that the iddhi which follow are powers of that "other body" 
created as a result of passing through the four jhanas. 
The possible shamanistic and, hence, magically oriented origin of iddhi is 
furthered by what appears to be a growing suspicion on the part of early Bud-
dhism toward the public display of paranormal or superhuman psychic powers. 
In the Kevaddha Sutta of the Digha Nikilya the Buddha is represented as 
warning against the use of magical wonders because they might be confused 
with the use of magical charms practiced in Gandhara.77 He is made to say, 
"It is because I perceive danger in the practice of mystic wonders, that I 
loath, and abhor, and am ashamed thereof."78 In the Vinaya Pifaka it is stated 
that a monk should not display psychic powers before the laity beyond the 
powers of ordinary men.79 The Sampasadaniya Sutta of the Digha Nikaya 
makes it clear that there are indeed two types of iddhi, one which is termed 
ignoble and the other noble.80 The ignoble are those powers discussed above 
in the Samaiiiiaphala Sutta and elsewhere in the Nikayas.81 In the Sampasil-
daniya Sutta the iddhis are labeled ignoble since they are concomitant with 
mental intoxicants and worldly aims.82 In other words, it is possible to employ 
the fruits of the jhilna or the iddhi in such a manner that the mundane world, 
rather than being transcended, becomes even more attractive and one's in-
volvement within it is deepened even further. lddhi produced through mana-
maya may become the occasion of a descent into the actual or phenomenal 
world rather than ascent into the real or noumenal. 
In contrast to the ignoble powers, all of which involve some superhuman 
power, the Sampasadaniya Sutta describes the noble powers as follows: "When 
a bhikkhu can, if he so desire, remain unconscious of the disgust amid what 
is disgusting; or conscious of disgust amid what is not disgusting; or uncon-
scious of disgust amid what is both disgusting and the opposite; or, avoiding 
both that which is disgusting and the opposite, should remain indifferent to 
them as such, mindful and understanding."83 As should be expected, the 
77 The Dialogues of the Buddha, 1:278. 
78 Ibid. 
79 The Book of Discipline (Vinaya-Pitaka), 5 vols., trans. I. B. Horner, Sacred Books 
of the Buddhists (London: Luzac & Co., 1940-1952), 2:112. 
80 The Dfgha NiktJya, 3:112. 
81 See the Kevaddha Sutta. 
82 The Digha Nikaya, 3:112. 
88 Dialogues, 3: 107. 
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noble iddhis overcome the mental intoxicants ( ilsavas) and the worldly aims 
instead of becoming further embroiled in them. Rather than representing the 
superhuman or the magical, Aryan powers stand for control of saiiiiil or per-
ceptions and lead to an indifference (upekhaka) toward the disgusting and 
the nondisgusting, those polarities which qualify our perception of the phe-
nomenal world. 
The transformation of iddhi from an archaic, magical meaning is further 
illustrated by the Janavasabha Suttanta of the Digha Nikilya describing the 
four ways in which iddhi is developed. They are: concentration and effort with 
desire ( chanda-samildhi), concentration and effort with energy ( viriya-sa-
mildhi), concentration and effort with a "dominant idea" ( citta-samadhi), 
concentration and effort with investigation ( v'imatJtsil-samildhi) .84 Here we 
find a progression not to a state of ecstasy leading to powers of invisibility and 
flight, but rather a progression from desire ( chanda) to investigation ( v'i-
matJtsil), or from motivation and effort to a more refined and sophisticated use 
of the mind. It appears that iddhi as the fruit of jhilna becomes, rather than 
supernatural powers acquired in shamanistic trance, a discriminating under-
standing (vima1Jtsil) of the phenomenal world engendering a detached objec-
tivity ( upekhaka) in the face of the polarities of impure/pure, loathsome/ 
nonloathsome, disgusting/nondisgusting typical of the phenomenal or mundane 
world. 
In addition to iddhi, the Samaiiiiaphala Sutta indicates that other powers 
are acquired by the sama~a who has overcome the n'ivara~as and acquired the 
jhanas. These powers are said to be the heavenly or divine ear; discernment 
of various types of minds or citta; knowledge of previous existences ; the 
heavenly or divine eye with which the adept " ... sees beings as they pass 
away from one form of existence and take shape in another .... "85 These 
supranormal powers eventually developed into a stereotyped list of six ab-
hiiiiiils (higher knowledge). They appear in the Dasuttara Suttanta of the 
Digha Nikilya as follows: ( 1) the iddhis in their various modes described 
above; (2) "deva-hearing" by which the adept "hears sounds both heavenly 
and human, far and near" ; ( 3) a mind that ". . . understands the minds of 
other beings, other persons ... " ; ( 4) an ability to recall to mind " ... the 
various temporary states as he lived in days gone by ... "; ( 5) "deva-sight" 
by which "he discerns the pageant of beings faring according to their deeds" ; 
( 6) the realization and knowledge of the extinction of the "intoxicants" 
(ilsavas) and the attainment of freedom.86 
We can discern in this list an amalgam of two different types of abhiiiiili. 
In the first instance there is the type illustrated by the occurrence of the 
84 The Digha Nikaya, 2:213. 
811 Ibid., 1: 79£. 
86 Ibid., 3:281. See also Dialogues, 3:257£. 
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supranormal powers in the Siimannaphala Sutta. There the abhiiiiiiis are ac-
quired as the result of jhana through the power of manomaya. In particular, 
however, abhinna seems to express a psychic or mental power in contrast to 
the extraordinary physical power of the iddhis. For example, the heavenly ear 
and the divine eye would appear above all else to indicate a heightened mode 
of perception enabling the adept to arrive at a supranatural knowledge border-
ing on omniscience. Thus iddhi and abhinna seem to complement each other, 
the one pointing to physical power, the other to mental power. It is just such 
a mutually supporting role, for example, that iddhi and abhinna play in the 
Akankheyya Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya. 87 
There is, on the other hand, another type of abhinnli in the Dasuttara Sut-
tanta list, a "higher knowledge" of the destruction of all attachments to the 
mundane and of the realization of ultimate reality or nibbana. This aspect of 
the abhinnlis is found in the Samyutta Nikaya, where they are preceded by the 
"middle path" and followed by enlightenment and nibbana.88 Or, again in the 
Anguttara Nikaya where it is said that the abhinnas lead to full emancipa-
tion,89 and the Digha where we find that they are contrary to priestly super-
stitions and vain (sophistical) speculations.90 In other words, abhinnli, at this 
level, is insight into the truth claims of Buddhism regarding the nature of 
reality. It may be that the two seemingly different types of abhinnli represent 
a synthesis of a more popular and "primitive," magically oriented tradition 
with the more sophisticated, ethically oriented tradition of the priests. It is 
difficult to assert, as the Pali Text Society Dictionary does, that the more 
magically oriented understanding of abhinna is later.91 Perhaps all that can 
be safely said is that in the Nikayas the two traditions came to be amalgamated. 
That is to say, it was expected that as a person gained detachment from the 
phenomenal world he not only gained a "higher knowledge" ( abhi-jna), but 
supranormal powers ( iddhis) as well. 
Having destroyed the nivara~as, attained the jhiinas, the iddhis, and abhin-
fias, the Samaiinaphala Sutta goes on to say that the samanna is then able to 
destroy the "deadly floods" or "intoxicants" ( lisavas) that are part of the 
attachment of the profane man to the mundane world. In this sutta the iisavas 
are enumerated as kama (sensual desire), bhava (becoming or desire for 
future life), and avij ja (ignorance of the four noble truths) . 92 One of the 
most famous passages referring to the intoxicants is contained in a formula 
repeated throughout the Nikayas, the Mahiiparinibbiina Sutta in particular. 
87 The Majjhima Nikaya, 1:33. 
88 The Book of Kindred Sayings, 5:357. 
89 The Book of Gradual Sayings, 4:179. 
90 The Digha Nikaya, 3:131. 
91 Rhys Davids and Stede, Pali-English Dictionary, p. 64. 
92 The Digha Nikaya, 1:83. 
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It illustrates the interrelationship of conduct ( s'ila), concentration ( samiidhi), 
and understanding (paiiiili) in overcoming the lisavas. After affirming that 
concentration must be accompanied by right conduct and understanding by 
concentration, the passage concludes that the mind ( citta) of the individual 
surrounded by a profound understanding (paiiiili) of the nature of reality will 
be freed ( vimuccati) from being "poured out" ( lisava) into the mundane 
world through sensual desires, the wish for a life of continual becoming, false 
views, and ignorance of his true state of being.93 
The lisavas, as do the n'ivara1Jas, serve to clarify that from which the jhlinas 
free a man. Fundamentally it is the mundane, specifically as the world of 
sensuous desire, becoming, anger, worry, dullness, stupidity; or, in other words, 
ignorant, unthinking involvement in and attachment to the empirical world. 
The jhlinas represent stages by which an individual attains a power of mind 
( manomaya) which represents a new order of being, "another body" ( aiiiia 
kliya) as the text states it. This new being is graphically illustrated by certain 
powers the texts describe partially in the terms of a popular, magical tradition 
and partially in terms of the higher knowledge represented by the Buddhist 
analysis of existence. We may conclude that the jhanas preserve two types 
of knowledge in relationship to the salvation quest: ecstasy and a mode of 
knowledge characterized by v'imat}1sli, vitakka, and viclira or more rational and 
discriminating forms of thinking. Knowledge as power, then, comes to take 
on a rather particular meaning. It is power over the world of becoming and 
change, but it is also the power of new being. 
UPEKKHA AND THE UNLIMITEDS 
We have seen in our discussion of jhana that upekkha (equanimity) appeared 
in the third stage and that in the fourth there remained only sati (mindful-
ness) and upekkhli. Having discussed the former term, we now turn to an 
examination of upekkhli. The word upekkhli is derived from the Sanskrit root 
'ik~, meaning to gaze or look at, plus the prefix upa; hence, the word literally 
means to overlook or neglect.94 Its meaning is extended, however, to denote 
patience, equanimity, or indifference. The Plili Text Society Dictionary de-
fines upekkha as, "hedonic neutrality or indifference, the zero point between 
joy and sorrow."95 A. B. Keith notes that upekkhli, as a quality of the third 
and fourth jhana, does not actually connote a hedonistic sense of indifference 
but rather an intellectual neutrality. Thus, upekkha, at least in its jhanic con-
text, is an impartial tolerance in regard to all mental states.96 
93 Ibid., 2:81. 
94 Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p. 215. 
95 Rhys Davids and Stede, ?ali-English Dictionary, p. 150. 
96 A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, 4th ed. (Varanasi: Chow-
khamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1963), p. 126. 
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A broad survey of the uses of upekkhii in the Theravada tradition is given 
by Edward Conze as follows: ( 1) neutral feelings which are neither pleasant 
nor unpleasant, (2) an attitude of "serene unconcern" or sameness of thought 
arising from the practice of concentration or jhiina, ( 3) the final stage of 
worldly wisdom just prior to reaching the Path when evenmindedness toward 
all conditioned beings is achieved, ( 4) the equanimity of the Arahant who 
retains a natural state of purity, ( 5) the equanimity of the Arahant as con-
trasted with the dull indifference of ignorant men, and (6) an attitude or 
impartiality providing an antidote to ill will and sensuous greed.97 
In the Nikayas themselves we discover that upekkha is used frequently in 
the formula of the four brahma vihiiras or the abodes of brahmii. The brahma 
viharas are four "states of mind" that result, after death, in a rebirth in the 
heavenly worlds of brahmii.98 There is disagreement among Buddhist scholars 
as to the origin of the brahma vihiiras. T. W. Rhys Davids contends that 
they were almost certainly exclusively Buddhist,99 whereas E. J. Thomas be-
lieves they show a direct connection with Brahmanical practices since they 
occur in the Yoga Sutras.100 Regardless of origin, however, the brahma 
viharas are important as modes of heightened awareness, although they are 
not in themselves the highest goal of nibbtina.101 
Another term used in the Nikayas to define the brahma vihtiras is appa-
maiiiiii or "infinite feelings."102 This term is applied to these states of mind or 
categories of consciousness dealing with mind expansion. M ahasudassana 
Suttanta of the Digha Nikaya reports the following attainments of "the Great 
King of Glory" after reaching the fourth jhiina: "And he let his mind pervade 
one quarter of the world with thoughts of love ; and so the second quarter 
and so the third and so the fourth. And thus the whole wide world, to pervade 
with heart of love, far-reaching, grown great, and beyond measure, free from 
the least trace of anger or ill will."103 And in a similar fashion he pervaded the 
whole world with a consciousness of compassion, sympathetic joy, and equa-
nimity. The brahma viharas in general and upekkha in particular represent, 
if you will, universal states of consciousness. They are one of the somewhat 
paradoxical outcomes of the process of meditation and the control of the mind 
which has been described in the Nikayas, a process that becomes even more 
97 Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, pp. 89-90. 
9BThe four brahma vihtiras are: love (metta), compassion (karu~;~ii), sympathetic joy 
(muditii), and equanimity (upekkhii). 
99 Dialogues, 1:298. 
1oo Edward J. Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought, 2d ed. (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1951), p. 50. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Appamaiiiiii corresponds to the Sanskrit priimli1Jya + the prefix, a, literally meaning 
"not." 
103 Dialogues, 2:219. 
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refined in a later period. This outcome of Buddhist meditation is seemingly 
paradoxical in that the progression from sati to samiidhi, and even into the 
jhlinas, was primarily a narrowing down of the consciousness. But the nar-
rowing of the consciousness was for the purpose of its ultimate liberation. The 
refinement of the mind was important primarily for the elimination of attach-
ment to the objects of sense and concomitantly to develop such mental control 
that the mind developed the power to construct a new reality ( manomaya). 
That is to say, the purpose of meditation in the Nikayas is to free the mind 
from dependence on sensory objects so that it can be expanded to realities 
which defy empirical definition. Upekkhii, therefore, becomes the last element 
in the seven factors of enlightenment and is a characteristic shared by both 
Arahants and buddhas. 
Perhaps the significance of the difference in consciousness implied by upek-
khli and ordinary states of consciousness can be best demonstrated by refer-
ring to two Nikaya texts. The Sa!ayatanavibhmiga Sutta of the Majjhima 
Nikaya lists six indifferences (upekkhii). A worldly indifference is" ... the 
indifference on seeing a thing which appertains to the ignorant and foolish 
average man ... such indifference ... fails to transcend the thing seen ... "104 
By way of contrast the indifference of renunciation arises when " ... on dis-
cerning the transitory nature of things seen and their mutability, instability 
and annihilation, indifference arises from causal understanding."105 Upekkhii 
denotes, therefore, a transcendence of the thing seen. 
Assuming that meditation frees the mind from dependence on the mundane 
world, to what is it freed? The answer must of necessity be in abstract terms, 
and the person who is looking for a concrete definition of the knowledge of 
ultimates is bound to be disappointed; however, one answer given by the 
Nikayas is found in the Mahiivadella Sutta of the Majjhima Nikiiya. There, 
in a conversation between Sariputta and Kotthita the Great, Sariputta dis-
cusses four "freedoms" of the mind ( cetovimutti) : appamii1Jii (immeasurable), 
iikincafifia (nothingness), sufifiatii (emptiness), animitta ( signless) .106 All 
four of these characteristics of the cetovimutti are identical in that they con-
note a state or condition of nonattachment. They also point beyond themselves 
to a reality beyond definition, a reality that can be known but not in the way 
that people ordinarily know. The whole thrust of Buddhist meditation, there-
fore, is to produce a condition of consciousness in which ultimate reality can 
be known directly, just as objects are perceived directly in the phenomenal 
world. The Buddhist way of coming to know ultimate reality is to produce a 
condition of being in which reality can be perceived directly. It is because the 
104 The Further Dialogues of the Buddha (Majjhima Nikaya), 2 vols., trans. Robert 
Chalmers (London: Oxford University Press, 1926-1927), 2:280. 
105 Ibid. 
106 The Majjhima Nikaya, 1:297. 
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reality to be known is "other" than that which is ordinarily known that the 
process of meditation-sati, samadhi, jhana and upekkhii-is undergone. The 
cognizing apparatus must be transformed since, indeed, to reach nibbiina in-
volves a total transformation of consciousness and being. 
The process of meditation described in the Pali suttas provides the proper 
context for a discussion of Buddhist epistemology. Epistemology in Buddhism 
is basically a soteriological and not a philosophical problem. To understand 
the Theravada view of knowledge ( vinniina and panna) demands a serious 
study of the structure of Buddhist meditation. This essay has attempted such 
a study. It has argued that within the progressive refinement of consciousness 
developed in the Buddhist meditative process, discriminating and analytical 
modes of knowledge played a decisive role, both in terms of understanding the 
true nature of things as well as in producing a state of detachment. It has 
further argued that meditation leads to a state of consciousness in which only 
a nondiscriminating mode of knowledge is appropriate. Such knowledge might 
be labeled mystical or intuitive but, finally, as the texts themselves point out, 
it is without any proper designation ( animittii). 
